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Abstract. The problem-oriented design of collective intelligence systems (CIS) 
is in itself an open problem. Previous research draws upon findings from bio-
logical swarm intelligence to derive guiding design principles but also high-
lights the importance of evaluating the system’s state with respect to the given 
problem. We investigate this evaluation task on the individual and the global 
level within the framework inspired by reinforcement learning. We map differ-
ent modes of evaluation to different schemes of rewarding agents, thereby illus-
trating that designer of CIS face the task of reward shaping. We simulate sever-
al reward schemes as variations of the well-known ant colony system (ACS). 
We show that rewards in the ACS, although they consist only of a single value, 
the metaphorical pheromone concentration, have complex semantics, and coor-
dinate the distribution of information and allocation of work within the system. 
This makes the ACS a valuable source of inspiration for CIS with human 
agents. 
Keywords: collective intelligence, swarm intelligence, reinforcement learning. 
1 Introduction 
The topic of collective intelligence (CI) is increasingly generating attention from re-
searchers and practitioners alike [1, 2]. The last decade has produced new and suc-
cessful forms of collaboration such as crowdsourcing [3], open innovation [4] and 
wikis [5]. Researchers and the general public have readily filed these successes as 
examples of CI or more colloquial the “wisdom of the crowds” [6, 7], the latter ex-
pression stemming from a book of the same name [8]. However, despite the afore-
mentioned examples of success, a general, goal-oriented approach to the design and 
implementation of systems that enable CI – collective intelligence systems (CIS) – is 
still an open research problem [2, 9] and in fact has been since the 1990s [10].  
To a great extent, CIS design has been inspired by the behavior of animal swarms, 
often called swarm intelligence (SI). A review of early work seeking to derive proper-
ties of CI from the behavior of insect swarms can be found in [11]. More recent ex-
amples of work on the application of SI principles – e. g. stigmergy, adaptivity, flexi-
bility, robustness, and self-organization – to business and economics include [12–15]. 
There is a historic tendency to equate the SI of insects with the CI of humans. How-
ever, while SI principles provide valuable guidelines for CIS design, it is also obvious 
  
that the analogy carries only so far. The differences between animal swarms and hu-
man collectives impose limitations on the degree to which SI is applicable to humans. 
Human abilities would be neglected in a CIS design guided solely by SI principles 
[16].  
In this paper, we seek to investigate the transition between SI and CI more closely. 
We depart from three observations. First, CI often builds on SI only in a metaphorical 
sense. Vocabulary from SI is used to describe a working system, but the actual system 
is very different from the inspiring SI. A very well-known example of this is the ant 
colony system (ACS) metaheuristic [17, 18]. The ACS-algorithm draws on inspiration 
from SI to simulate a colony of artificial ants that can solve problems of combinatori-
al optimization. But the swarm metaphor is only one way of framing the algorithm. It 
can also be described within the framework of reinforcement learning [19]. Second, in 
previous work focusing on the systems aspect of CIS, the state of the CIS itself is 
assumed to have an intrinsic value with respect to a given problem [10, 20]. Assum-
ing that this value is maximal for a solution state, the task of designing a problem-
oriented CIS comes down to the alignment of the collective’s evaluation of states with 
the evaluation of state with respect to the given problem [10] In other words, the sys-
tem needs to be crafted so that its states align to a given utility function of the indi-
viduals. To achieve this, additional incentives beyond the intrinsic value of states 
might be needed [9]. Third, both, the SI-perspective and the systems-perspective 
share the notion that information is distributed within the collective, i. e. none of the 
individuals has complete knowledge or a complete representation of the problem to be 
solved [11, 21, 22]. 
Using ACS as an example and reinforcement learning as a formal frame of reference 
for the study of state-values, we conduct a simulation experiment to address the fol-
lowing questions: 
1. Where does the ACS go beyond the inspiration of SI? 
2. How does varying the reward which the individuals receive for their actions impact 
the system’s performance? 
3. How does varying the way in which individuals share information influence the 
system’s performance? 
 
We find that, despite its heavy reliance on the swarm metaphor, the behavior of 
agents in the ACS is very unlike that of real ants. On the contrary it is carefully craft-
ed so that the structure of rewards incentivizes intelligent exploitation of shared in-
formation on the system-wide scale. These findings suggest that the structure of re-
wards and distribution of information are two aspects that need to be carefully consid-
ered when designing a CIS, even though they play almost no part in the swarm meta-
phor. We show that the performance of the whole system crucially depends on the 
rewarding scheme as selected by the designer. Individuals need not only to be incen-
tivized to take actions directed towards solving the problem but also to disclose in-
formation gathered during the process, including information on failed attempts.  
  
2 Background 
2.1 Collective Intelligence and the Swarm Metaphor 
There are many definitions of CI. For this paper, we use a definition from [22], that 
“CI is the ability of sufficiently large groups of individuals to create an emergent 
solution for a specific class of problems or tasks”. This is in line with the consensus 
of many researchers, as found in [1], that “CI is greater than the sum of individual 
contributions”, which is a simplified way to describe emergence, and that “CI is goal-
oriented and focuses on specific problems”. To provide an understanding how this 
definition builds upon SI, we discuss the swarm metaphor for the ACS. The swarm 
metaphor is probably best introduced by the words of Dorigo and Gambardella: 
“The natural metaphor on which ant algorithms are based is that of ant colonies. 
Real ants are capable of finding the shortest path from a food source to their nest 
without using visual cues by exploiting pheromone information. While walking, ants 
deposit pheromone on the ground, and follow, in probability, pheromone previously 
deposited by other ants.”[17] 
This conception draws on earlier work which proposes a simple pheromone model to 
explain two observations of the behavior displayed by colonies of real ants while 
foraging for food: 
 Presented with a road bifurcation and later rejoin that creates two paths of equal 
length (a “diamond shaped bridge”), a colony of the ant Iridomyrmex humilis will 
arbitrate on one path and disregard the other one [23] 
 Presented with a road bifurcation and later rejoin that creates two path of different 
length, a colony of the ant Lasius niger will arbitrate on the shorter path and disre-
gard the other one [24]. 
The behavior of said species is emergent in the sense that the ants do not have any 
concept of efficient collective foraging on a global scale but follow only simple local 
rules. It is self-organizing in the sense that no designated leader decides what path 
should be taken and there is no explicit decision process. The colony arbitrating on 
one path is a result only of the accumulation of pheromones on that path [23, 24]. The 
properties of emergence and self-organization are the hallmark of CI as defined 
above. 
The ACS-algorithm uses swarm principles to provide a heuristic solution for prob-
lems of combinatorial optimization such as the travelling salesman problem (TSP) 
[17]. In contrast, recent research applies the same swarm principles, in the form of CI, 
to tackle wicked problems, e. g. global climate change [2, 25]. While these con-
trasting applications give an impression of the power of the swarm metaphor, swarm 
principles alone provide little insight into the design of CIS or, as Introne et al. put it, 
“there are many examples of such [CI] systems, but there is no clear recipe for their 
development” [25]. Therefore, we are interested in a notion of what makes CIS work 
that can be operationalized in CIS design. We use the ACS as an example, because it 
consists of a very small set of rules and actions and it can be investigated in simula-
tion. 
  
2.2 The Intrinsic Value of States 
To get a measure for the success of a CIS, we follow [21] and [20] by assuming that 
the state of the CIS, what we refer to as the global state, can be mapped to a solution 
candidate of the problem under consideration. A given solution candidate then can be 
evaluated with respect to the problem to get what we refer to as the global value of 
the underlying state. In principle, the state of spaces could simply be searched for the 
optimal solution, or, taking restrictions on transitions between states into account, a 
path to the optimal solution [26]. In practice, however, this is not possible, if the space 
of solutions, and thereby the space of states, is too large to be searched exhaustively 
or not clearly defined in the first place. It is no coincidence that these issues character-
ize the hardness of combinatorial optimization problems and wicked problems respec-
tively. For a detailed discussion of wicked problems cf. [27]. The solution to this di-
lemma, as offered by the swarm metaphor, is that the transitions of the system’s state 
are not guided by a global perception of value but by individual’s local perceptions of 
the value of a given state. Individual behavior under such conditions can be modelled 
as reinforcement learning [10, 26, 28]. Emergence can be interpreted as the fact, that 
the criteria for global evaluation may be radically different from the individual evalu-
ation and even include the translation of the state into a different ontology [22]. 
Reinforcement learning is agents learning what actions to take, on the basis of observ-
ing reward signals. This includes balancing observation and exploitation [29]. We 
focus specifically on the Q-Learning Algorithm [30]. Let 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) be the expected 
value of performing an action 𝑎 when in some state 𝑠 from an agent’s point of view. 
The agents can learn the values of 𝑄 from experience by repeatedly performing an 
action and observing the change of state and received rewards. An agent who in state 
𝑠 has performed action 𝑎, resulting in the new state 𝑠′ and reward 𝑟 may apply the 
following update rule: 
 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) ← (1 − 𝛼)𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) + 𝛼(𝑟 + 𝛾 max𝑎′ 𝑄(𝑠
′, 𝑎′)) (1) 
The intuition here is that the value of a state-action pair is given by the immediate 
reward 𝑟 plus the future reward to be expected from exploiting the available infor-
mation on the new state 𝑠′ (hence the max) but discounted by some factor 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1. 
In some scenarios, 𝑟 is always zero, except for entering some goal state, so that the 
value of all other state-action pairs equals this reward discounted for the distance to 
the goal state. For typical reinforcement learning settings, the Q-learning update rule 
(1) converges to the true values of 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) [30]. Once this fact is established, the op-
timal strategy for agents is obvious: In general choose 𝑎 as to maximize 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) for 
the current state 𝑠 (exploitation). But with a small probability choose another action at 
random to learn about new state-action values (exploration). 
For a functional CIS, global and local perception of a state’s value must be in align-
ment [10]. In simulated SI, e. g. the ACS, this can be enforced by design. In CIS with 
human collectives the designer has to solve this problem by presenting the CIS in a 
way that aligns with the individual motivation and add incentives where this is not 
possible [9]. Translated to the language of reinforcement learning, reward shaping 
refers to the idea that at a state transition some additional reward 𝐹(𝑠, 𝑠′) may be 
  
provided by design, as to improve the speed of learning [31]. Earlier work has clearly 
emphasized the importance of motivation and incentives in CIS [32–34]. There are 
many known means of incentivisation for CIS [35, 36]. Successful examples include 
monetary incentives (e. g. the Netflix Prize [37]) and non-monetary rewards such as 
access to webpages (e. g. reCAPTCHA [38]) and gamification (e. g. the “ESP game” 
[39]).  
2.3 The Ant Colony System 
We introduce the ACS as a heuristic solution to the TSP following [17]. First we de-
fine the TSP. Let 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) be a weighted complete graph where the set of vertices 
𝑉 = {𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑛}  is interpreted as a list of cities and the set of edges 
𝐸 = {(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗): 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗 ∈ 𝑉} contains connections between any two cities. The weight of 
an edge, 𝑤(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) denotes the travelling distance between cities 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑣𝑗. A Hamil-
tonian cycle in 𝐺 is a closed path that visits each vertex exactly once. We interpret 
this as a salesman visiting each city in the list and call the Hamiltonian cycle a tour. 
Since 𝐺 by definition is a complete graph there are (𝑛 − 1)!/2 tours. The TSP is the 
problem of finding the tour for which the sum of weights, i. e. the total distance trav-
elled, is minimal. 
The ACS goes about the TSP as follows: Every edge gets assigned a level of phero-
mones 𝜏(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) which is interpreted as a measure of how desirable using that edge in 
a tour is. 𝜏 is initialized at some 𝜏0  for each (𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) ∈ E. A number 𝑚 of artificial 
agents, the so called ants, are placed on random vertices. Each ant 𝑙 keeps track of its 
unvisited vertices 𝑈𝑙. The simulation proceeds in discrete timesteps. In each timestep, 
every ant 𝑙 chooses the next city to visit according to the following rule: 
Let 𝜂(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) be 1/𝑤(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) and 𝑣𝑖,𝑙 be the current location of ant 𝑙. The new location 
𝑣𝑗,𝑙 is given by 
 𝑣𝑗,𝑙 = {
arg max𝑣𝑗∈𝑈𝑙 {𝜏(𝑣𝑖,𝑙 , 𝑣𝑗)𝜂(𝑣𝑖,𝑙 , 𝑣𝑗)
𝛽
}    𝑞 ≤ 𝑞0
𝑆   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (2) 
In the first case the ant exploits the pheromone information of how desirable an edge 
is, weighted against the length of this edge. 𝛽 is a parameter that allows to manipulate 
the relative importance of the two factors. The exploiting move is chosen with proba-
bility 𝑞0, i. e. 𝑞 is a random number. The second case is the case where the ant ex-
plores other options. 𝑆 is a city chosen at random according to the following distribu-
tion: 
 𝑝𝑙(𝑣𝑗) =  {
𝜏(𝑣𝑖,𝑙,𝑣𝑗)𝜂(𝑣𝑖,𝑙,𝑣𝑗)
𝛽
∑ 𝜏(𝑣𝑖,𝑙,𝑣𝑘)𝜂(𝑣𝑖,𝑙,𝑣𝑘)
𝛽
𝑣𝑘∈𝑈𝑙
  𝑣𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝑙
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (3) 
When an ant transitions from 𝑣𝑖,𝑙  to 𝑣𝑗,𝑙  the pheromone trail 𝜏(𝑣𝑖,𝑙 , 𝑣𝑗,𝑙)  is updated 
according to the swarm metaphor with the following update rule: 
  
 𝜏(𝑣𝑖,𝑙 , 𝑣𝑗,l) ← (1 − 𝛼)𝜏(𝑣𝑖,𝑙 , 𝑣𝑗,𝑙) + 𝛼𝜏0 (4) 
This is called the local update. 𝛼 is a parameter that models the decay of pheromones 
over time.   
When all ants have finished their respective tours, the shortest tour observed so far is 
determined. Let 𝐿𝑔 be the length of this tour and 𝑇𝑔 ⊂ 𝐸 be the edges on it. A global 
update of pheromone concentration is performed so that:  
 𝜏(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) ← (1 − 𝛼)𝜏(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) + 𝛼𝜏Δ(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) (5) 
 𝜏Δ(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) = {
1/𝐿𝑔  (𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) ∈ 𝑇𝑔
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (6) 
After the global update the whole procedure is repeated until an end condition, e. g. a 
fixed number of iterations has been reached [17]. 
This concludes the description of the ACS in terms of the swarm metaphor, using 
pheromones as the central concept. Alternatively it is possible to apply reinforcement 
learning to the ACS for the TSP. Agents map to ants, states map to current locations, 
choosing an action maps to choosing the next city to visit and 𝑄 generally maps to 𝜏. 
There even is exploration and exploitation. However, the updating mechanism for 𝜏 in 
the ACS in eq. (4) differs from the Q-learning update rule in eq. (1). AntQ [19] is a 
hybrid algorithm that draws on both Q-learning and the swarm metaphor. AntQ 
equals the ACS but with (1) instead of (4) as the local update rule. In fact AntQ pre-
dates the ACS, and rule (4) was a later simplification [17]. 
3 Dissecting the ACS 
3.1 Setting 
In the following, we use the term global state of the ACS to refer to the 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix 
that contains the values of 𝜏 for all edges. This is not to be confused with the local 
state an ant finds itself in, i. e. a current location and a list of unvisited locations. Ants 
estimate the local value of adjacent states using the distance to this state and the pher-
omone density on the way. One way to understand this, is to assume that an ant locat-
ed at city 𝑣𝑖,𝑙 can only observe a subset of the global state: the pheromones on edges 
adjacent to 𝑣𝑖,𝑙. When moving to another location, the ant updates both its local state 
and the global state. The list of unvisited locations can be interpreted as the ant’s 
working memory. It can never be observed by other ants. This is consistent with the 
model of CI introduced in [22]. The working memory is used only to guarantee a 
feasible solution, i. e. that no city is visited more than once. It is not used to make the 
choice which particular city should be visited next [17]. Note that this is a major limi-
tation with respect to reinforcement learning and the TSP. In theory, the value of a 
(local) state-action pair represents the desirability of adding the respective edge to a 
tour. This value obviously depends on the position of the edge within the tour. Not 
being allowed to use its list of unvisited cities when estimating state-action values 
deprives the ant of potentially valuable information. In practice, there are 2𝑛 − 1 pos-
  
sibilities for the list of unvisited cities so making this list part of the local state rather 
than working memory as a separate entity would lead to a combinatorial explosion of 
the state space.  
The power of the ACS stems from the fact that it produces a heuristic solution by 
considering a much smaller search space. This is the principle that makes the swarm 
metaphor attractive. Real ants, while solving the complex task of pathfinding, have no 
conception of the problem they solve. SI emerges from individuals of very limited 
intelligence following simple rules [12]. In the ACS setting, we use the term emer-
gence to refer to the idea that individual ants evaluate the state, i. e. the pheromone 
trails, locally in terms of whether they should travel along a given edge. The local 
evaluation criterion is fundamentally different from the global value which we define 
as the length of a tour induced by the 𝜏-matrix. Note that most local values refer to 
edges that are not part of the final tour and therefore have no direct connection to the 
global value. Since we are interested in emergence, we measure the ACS performance 
not in terms of how good it solves the TSP as an optimization problem, but in terms 
of the construction of an emergent solution. For global evaluation, we do not keep 
track of a best tour that might have been encountered by some “lucky” ant or a best 
global state the system might have inhibited at some point in time. Instead we meas-
ure the length of the tour induced by 𝜏 using the rule in eq. (2) with pure exploitation, 
i. e. 𝑞0 = 1, after a fixed number of 500 iterations. The reasoning behind this meas-
urement is first, that within the swarm metaphor an ant would not realize if it had hit a 
“lucky” tour and second, that, strictly speaking, emergence implies convergence to a 
stable state [40]. A system that deviates from an earlier superior state does not really 
exhibit emergence. 
We generated ten random instances of the TSP. For each instance we choose 64 ran-
dom points on a 256 × 256 grid and use the pairwise Euclidean distances as edge 
weights. 
3.2 Baseline ACS 
As a baseline, we implement the ACS from [17] with only a few minor changes. We 
use the parameter settings reported therein: 𝛽 = 2, 𝑞0 = 0.9, 𝛼 = 0.1, 𝜏0 =
1
𝑛𝐿𝑛𝑛
 
,where 𝐿𝑛𝑛 is the length of the tour generated by the nearest neighbor heuristic. We 
call the tour length emerging from the ACS, according to the measurement described 
above, 𝐿𝑎𝑐𝑠. Note that, due to the way the ACS is initialized, the nearest neighbor 
heuristic is a special case of the ACS where the evaluation takes place after zero itera-
tions, i. e. without running the ACS at all. In the following we will judge the perfor-
mance of variations of the ACS relative to 𝐿𝑛𝑛  and 𝐿𝑎𝑐𝑠 . A variation performing 
worse than 𝐿𝑛𝑛 is one that actually evolved the system away from the solution state. 
We do not make comparisons with fundamentally different solution methods, e. g. 
branch-and-cut.  
Earlier work reports simulating 𝑚 = 10 ants over 2500 iterations [17]. However, we 
observe little to no improvement in the majority of iterations. Overall, we observe 
better results with 𝑚 = 50 and 500 iterations. Note that the number of tours generated 
  
is equal in both cases (25000), only the number of global updates is smaller. We dis-
cuss this in more detail later in this paper. One final change we have made, is that all 
the ants start at the same city and build their tours sequentially rather than concurrent-
ly. This is necessary to allow a fair comparison of all variations we implement. The 
resulting algorithm is given below: 
Initialize 𝜏 to 𝜏0 and 𝑡 to 0 
while (𝑡 < 500) 
 for each ant 
  while |𝑈𝑙| > 0 
   select 𝑢𝑗,𝑙 according to eq. (2) 
   update 𝜏 according to eq. (4) 
   remove 𝑢𝑗,𝑙 from 𝑈𝑙 
 globally update 𝜏 according to eq. (5) 
 increment t 
return length of tour induced by 𝜏 and eq. (2) with 𝑞0 = 1 
The ACS outperforms the nearest neighbor heuristic on all 10 instances of the TSP 
under consideration. On average, the relative tour length after 500 iterations of the 
ACS amounts to 82.4% of the tour length of the nearest neighbor heuristic. 
3.3 Differences between Global and Local Updates 
The ACS features two update mechanisms – cf. eq. (4) and (5) – which seem similar 
but actually work differently. The role of the global update is to keep the system’s 
state near the best tour found so far. The role of the local update in contrast is to en-
courage ants to explore paths not considered by their peers [17]. The first point is easy 
to see. Disregarding local updates, given enough global updates the only edges with 
non-zero pheromone concentration are edges on the globally best tour. In that case, 
our measure of emergent performance becomes equal to measuring the length of the 
best individual tour. In terms of emergence, the global update uses information that is 
not available to individual ants. There is no meaningful way to attribute the global 
update to the actions of an individual ant, especially since the globally best tour could 
have been generated several iterations ago. Therefore, in terms of reinforcement 
learning, the global update should not be interpreted as an act of individual learning 
but rather as a change of the environment with the goal of guiding the system in the 
right direction, i. e. as reward shaping. Within the swarm metaphor there is no such 
conception. It is clear that natural environments cannot exhibit this kind of adaption. 
So at this point the ACS already goes beyond the framing of the swarm metaphor.  
The role of local updates is less intuitive. In contrast to global updates, for local up-
dates the “pheromone decay” only takes place on edges that are actually visited by an 
ant, cf. eq. (4). Note that the local reward signal 𝜏0 is smaller than the global reward 
signal 1/𝐿𝑔  by approximately a factor n. This leads to the phenomenon that most 
often the local update actually decreases the pheromone concentration on the respec-
tive edge. This ensures the diversity of the ant’s respective tours and encourages ants 
  
to explore new tours that are similar but different compared to the best currently 
known tour [17]. While this appears to be a plausible mechanism from an optimiza-
tion point-of-view, it also breaks with the swarm metaphor. In the biological model, 
the net impact of laying pheromones is always positive in comparison to the decay of 
pheromones over time. This is because in the biological model, the latter effect is 
independent of the presence of an ant. Simulating the ACS, we observe a decrease of 
pheromone concentration at roughly 90% of all local updates. Coincidently, 𝑚 = 50, 
a value selected empirically for good overall performance, is close to 𝑛 = 64 so that, 
due to the factor 𝑛 in 𝜏0, the sum of all local updates in an iteration has approximately 
the same impact as the global update. This is coherent with results from [17]. 
To further investigate the interaction of global and local rewards we consider three 
variations of the ACS. First we implement AntQ, i. e. we use eq. (1) instead of eq. (4) 
for the local update. Be 𝑇𝑙  with length 𝐿𝑙 the tour constructed by the current ant. We 
reinforce the final edge of 𝑇𝑙  with the additional reward 1/𝐿𝑙 which becomes known 
only at the end of the tour. In theory, Q-learning should lead to this reward propagat-
ing back along tours thus shaping the local reward to follow the same principle as the 
global reward 1/𝐿𝑔. The reasoning behind this is simple: if the ants could learn to 
estimate the length of a tour at its outset, no longer would there be any need to dis-
courage edges already visited by peers. On the contrary, every new tour would make 
an improvement towards estimating the true value of edges. In simulation, this varia-
tion of AntQ still outperforms the nearest neighbor heuristic on all instances but only 
at 88.2% of the average tour length. AntQ outperforms the ACS on one instance by a 
very small margin, but on average results in a tour length of 107% of the ACS. 
The comparatively poor performance of AntQ suggests that information about the 
length of particular tours is of little value as a reward signal. Making local and global 
reward signals constant allows to estimate the value of this information. Therefore, as 
a second variation we test what we call the global-𝜏0 ACS. We use 𝜏0 instead of 
1
𝐿𝑔
 in 
eq. (6), thus shaping the global reward to match the local reward. In a third variation, 
global-𝐿𝑛𝑛  we use 
1
𝐿𝑛𝑛
 instead, i. e. a constant value in the same magnitude as the 
original 
1
𝐿𝑔
. These variations allow us not only to investigate the impact of the relative 
magnitude of local and global rewards on the system’s performance, but also the ef-
fect of shaping the global reward to match the local reward. In the simulation of four 
of the ten instances, global-𝜏0 displays a performance inferior to the nearest neighbor 
heuristic. The average relative tour length is 96.7%, making global-𝜏0 performance 
only slightly better than nearest neighbor and clearly worse than the ACS. In contrast, 
global-𝐿𝑛𝑛  outperforms the ACS on two instances although, like AntQ, only by a 
small margin. On average, the performance of global-𝐿𝑛𝑛 diverges from ACS perfor-
mance by less than 1%. 
3.4 Rewarding Global Progress 
So far, we followed the swarm metaphor in viewing pheromone concentration as a 
measure of how desirable it is to follow a given edge from an ant’s local perspective. 
  
This needs to be understood as conceptually different from viewing system wide 
pheromone concentration as a basis for the global evaluation of the system’s state. As 
we have pointed out, this dichotomy is a sign of the system’s emergent properties. 
However, it is up to discussion, and ultimately the CIS designer’s choice, what makes 
an edge desirable from the local perspective. In a general CIS with human agents, 
from the individual’s perspective, there may be intrinsic factors determining the de-
sirability of state-action pairs such as the perceived individual value of states and the 
individual cost of performing an action [26]. However, the CIS designer should seek 
to create incentives that let the individuals desire locally what lets the system make 
progress globally [9]. In the simulation of the ACS, this problem is greatly simplified, 
compared to a CIS with human agents, because we can shape the reward to any struc-
ture we want, and the individual ants are hardcoded to blindly adhere to any given 
measure of desirability. Nevertheless, the choice of a reward structure is not trivial. 
Our results from the previous section show, that rewarding ants locally with respect to 
the global ontology of tour lengths does not improve global performance. Empirically, 
it seems to be of very little value, to encode information on the tour length, as an indi-
cator of progress, into the reward signals, on both, the global and the local level.  
To further investigate this point, we consider the possibility of rewarding progress 
towards the global goal more directly. Wolpert and Tumer have shown that one way 
to implement successful CI is to define the local value of a state as the same state’s 
global value minus a hypothetical value that would have occurred, had the individual 
not existed. They call this “wonderful life utility” (WLU) [10]. We adapt this concep-
tion to the ACS as follows: In every iteration, we calculate not only the global value 
of the pheromone matrix but also for each ant the value of the pheromone matrix 
without the pheromones added by that ant in the current iteration. The difference of 
the two values, is a measure of the ant’s direct contribution, positive or negative, to 
the current global value. However, neither a strategy of shaping the AntQ-local re-
ward to reflect this difference nor the strategy to reinforce a positive contribution in 
retrospective with a reward of 1/𝐿𝑙  display a better performance than the nearest 
neighbor heuristic. 
Note that WLU, in the implementation described above, does not measure indirect 
contributions of a given ant to the global value. Other ants, having access to the pher-
omone traces laid by the given ant, change their behavior accordingly but this hap-
pens after the performance of the given ant has been measured and rewarded. While 
this is most likely the reason for the poor performance of an otherwise theoretically 
sound measurement of state-value, the “real” WLU is impractical to measure, because 
indirect effects extend indefinitely into the future. Every newly generated tour has the 
effect of branching the system into two possible futures, one with this tour and one 
without it. At every point, both branches would need to be tracked to measure indirect 
effects, creating an exponential number of branches. According to [10], calculating 
WLU is a “fictional counter-factual operation” that ignores the system’s dynamics. In 
case of the ACS, this is done by cancelling out the effect of a given ant on the state’s 
value. However, this is of little use, if most of the effect arises precisely from the 
system’s dynamics and is therefore not independently measurable. In addition to this 
conceptual problem, designing a CIS with human agents on the basis of WLU, is to 
  
ignore any intrinsic state-action values and superimpose an external system of values 
on the individuals. This is likely to be an inefficient and costly approach. 
3.5 The Value of Information 
Given the problems with the WLU approach and the poor performance of seemingly 
sophisticated rewarding schemes in simulation, we explore a different approach. Both 
reward schemes, AntQ and WLU, seek to include information on the problem into 
rewards. Accepting this to be a reasonable idea, we reinvestigate the simpler ACS 
reward scheme with respect to the information conveyed. From the discussion in Sec-
tion 3.3, it follows that the informational content of global reward essentially is “this 
edge is part of the best currently known tour”. The content of local reward is “this 
edge is part of one of your peer’s current tour”. The way in which ants balance this 
information and act upon it is hardcoded into the ACS. In terms of WLU, if indirect 
contributions are to be taken into account, the impact of a single ant on the system is 
not as much it’s construction of a new tour but rather broadcasting this tour to the 
other ants. It follows that WLU in the ACS amounts to a measure of the global value 
of the information that ant 𝑙 took tour 𝑇𝑙  in the current iteration.  
In absence of a way to approximate this value directly, we approach the problem by 
asking, under what circumstances an agent individually would be inclined to share 
this information. Note that the ACS assumes that the ants fully cooperate, i. e. share 
every tour with the other ants. Deactivating this mechanism completely lets the ACS 
become non-functional [17]. However there is another way of modelling non-
cooperative ants: let the ants keep track of pheromone concentrations but only for 
tours they constructed themselves, i. e. every ant has a private pheromone matrix. The 
global reward also is awarded individually, i. e. for the globally best tour that is 
known to a particular ant. For fair comparison with the ACS, global reward is scaled 
by 1/𝑛 so that a single ant’s local reward may still counterweight the global reward. 
The tour lengths produced by the non-cooperative ACS register between ACS tour 
length and nearest neighbor tour length for all instances. On average the tour length is 
105.5% of ACS tour length and 86.9% of nearest neighbor tour length thus indicating 
that the global value of cooperation is rather small in the given scenario but the global 
value of keeping track of previous tours is vital to performance. 
We investigate two alternative modes of cooperation. In the first mode we allow the 
agents, as the term ants no longer seems appropriate, to form permanent coalitions. If 
two agents or two groups of agents join forces, they gain access to a common phero-
mone matrix, a common best tour and all tours generated in the future by any member 
of the coalition. The results so far indicate that getting access to future tour infor-
mation is always a benefit for both sides. Economically it can be argued that having 
more agents exploiting the best tour creates additional welfare that can be split among 
the coalition in a way that creates incentives to join for both sides, e. g. using Shap-
ley-value. However, it directly follows from the reasoning above that there is no 
meaningful way for agents or groups of agents to compare the value of their private 
pheromone matrices. Therefore we allow ants to join forces only if their respective 
pheromone matrices currently induce the same tour, i. e. both parties can be sure that 
  
they do not lose an advantage to the other party. Simulation shows that these precon-
ditions for cooperation occur frequently and the system quickly converges to the 
grand coalition, with a performance almost equal to the ACS. 
As a second mode of cooperation we consider non-permanent cooperation and apply a 
slightly different reasoning. An agent may estimate the (local) value of a newly gen-
erated tour by comparing its length to that of the previously generated tour. If the new 
tour is longer than the old one the agent has made a discovery that is of no future 
value to itself, e. g. in terms of a competitive advantage, but has some value to other 
agents because they can avoid making the same mistake. Therefore, from an individu-
al perspective the agent can reasonably choose to “sell” the newly generated tour. 
This has the effect of allowing the agents to make local updates with selected external 
tours. The simulation results in a performance level between the non-cooperative 
variation and the variation with coalitions at an average of 102.2% of the ACS tour 
length.  
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
Our findings show, that the ACS conceptually goes beyond the swarm metaphor. 
Where real ants follow a simple mechanism of laying and following pheromone 
tracks, we have shown, that the pheromones in the ACS are used to convey different 
types of information, thus making for more complex semantics of rewards. However, 
the results also show that not all information is equally valuable in terms of the result-
ing global performance. Another aspect where the ACS goes beyond the swarm meta-
phor is the global update in itself. We have shown that the global update can be 
viewed as the doing of what we might call a “benevolent” environment, actively guid-
ing the individuals towards global success. 
Table 1. Overview of simulation results 
 Average tour length  
Variation relative to 𝐿𝑛𝑛 [%] relative to 𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑆 [%] 
ACS  82.4 100.0 
AntQ  88.2   107.0 
global-𝜏0  96.7 117.4  
global-𝐿𝑛𝑛  82.9 100.6 
WLU >100% - 
non-cooperative 86.9 105.5 
coalitions 82.7 100.4 
information-selling  84.2 102.2 
 
We made changes to the ACS, not with the goal to improve its overall performance 
but seeking to investigate what factors are responsible for performance. Therefore, it 
comes to no surprise that none of the variations tested, was able to outperform the 
original ACS on average. An overview of all simulation results reported is given in 
Table 1. Variations, which leave the original relationship between global and local 
  
rewards intact, tend to display performance similar to the original, whereas reward 
schemes that change this relationship, no matter how well-motivated in theory, lead to 
inferior performance. We view this as evidence that the balance of global and local 
rewards as proposed in [17] and confirmed by our own findings, is a central feature 
for the success of the ACS. 
Obviously, the result from [17] that modelling non-cooperative settings by making 
ants blind to pheromones ruins performance still holds. In addition to that, we have 
explored new ways of interpreting non-cooperation and limited cooperation within the 
ACS with respect to the agents’ willingness to share information based on a prior 
estimate of its value. We have shown that rational reasons to share information can be 
found. Agents acting according to these reasons, while not completely matching the 
performance of an ACS with total information, still perform relatively well. 
Earlier work, as discussed in the first part of this paper, basically has two guidelines 
to offer to the CIS designer. Follow the principles of the swarm metaphor [12] and 
incentivize desired behavior [36]. However, in spite of many successful CIS, it is 
often unclear how to apply these guidelines to a given problem. There are many ex-
amples for sophisticated ways to get collectives to fulfil the desired task, but the task 
itself, although often presented in a novel context, remains otherwise unchanged. This 
is only of limited use for wicked problems. For such problems, it is unclear, which 
course of actions would best fit the task at hand and therefore unclear which behavior 
should be incentivized. To mitigate this problem, CIS designers should not only tailor 
problem-specific reward schemes taking into account both global and local utility but 
also design the system to present the problem in a form that is accessible and interest-
ing for the collective, even if this leads to a complete reframing [9] 
Our investigation of the ACS adds empirical evidence to these conceptions, suggest-
ing that systems built on swarm principles are similar whether they solve optimization 
problems or wicked problems. But there is more. The rewarding scheme of the ACS 
is shown to have a dual function of encouraging stability and diversity. Rewards are 
not given on the basis of a global value as WLU might suggest, but as a direct conse-
quence of the cumulated earlier actions of the collective. It shows that a simple re-
ward mechanism that adapts as the system progresses as to guide individual action 
towards the global solution allows for a truly emergent solution that not only takes 
into account the limited processing capacity of individuals – which seems to be more 
of a problem for ants than for humans – but also the fundamental difficulty to provide 
meaningful local feedback in the same ontology in which global value is measured. 
Rewarding schemes with such a fundamentally dynamical component are yet to be 
tested on human CI.  
In addition, the pheromone mechanism, or more generally the incentive structure of 
the ACS makes it easy and attractive for agents to share relevant information thus 
allowing for cooperation and minimization of redundant work, even if this is not en-
forced by design. In terms of individual interests, the modified ACS creates an envi-
ronment in which the gain of sharing information massively outweighs the loss. Not 
only have we discussed rewarding principles of SI, but also have done this while con-
sidering agents’ individual interests, thereby making a first step towards what we 
might call “humanizing the swarm”.  
  
References 
1 Schoder, D., Gloor, P.A., Metaxas, P.T.: Social Media and Collective Intelligence—
Ongoing and Future Research Streams. Künstl. Intell. 27, 9–15 (2013) 
2 Schoder, D., Putzke, J., Metaxas, P.T., Gloor, P.A., Fischbach, K.: Informationssysteme für 
„Wicked Problems“. Forschung an der Schnittstelle von Social Media und Collective Intel-
ligence. Wirtschaftsinf 56, 3–11 (2014) 
3 Howe, J.: The Rise of Crowdsourcing, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html 
4 Chesbrough, H.W.: Open innovation. The new imperative for creating and profiting from 
technology. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass (2003) 
5 Tapscott, D., Williams, A.D.: Wikinomics. How mass collaboration changes everything. 
Portfolio, New York (2006) 
6 Bonabeau, E.: Decisions 2.0. The Power of Collective Intelligence. MIT Sloan Manage. 
Rev. 50, 45‐52 (2009) 
7 Buecheler, T., Sieg, J.H., Füchslin, R.M., Pfeifer, R.: Crowdsourcing, Open Innovation and 
Collective Intelligence in the Scientific Method - A Research Agenda and Operational 
Framework. In: Fellermann, H., Dörr, M., Hanczy, M.M., Laursen, L.L., Maurer, S., Merk-
le, D., Monnard, P.-A., Støy, K., Rasmussen, S. (eds.) Artificial Life XII, pp. 679–686. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2010) 
8 Surowiecki, J.: The wisdom of crowds. Why the many are smarter than the few and how 
collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies, and nations. Doubleday, New 
York (2005) 
9 Kornrumpf, A., Baumöl, U.: A Design Science Approach to Collective Intelligence Sys-
tems. 2014 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 361–370 (2014) 
10 Wolpert, D.H., Tumer, K.: An Introduction to Collective Intelligence (1999) 
11 Sulis, W.: Fundamental Concepts of Collective Intelligence. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychol-
ogy, and Life Sciences 1, 35‐53 (1997) 
12 Bonabeau, E., Meyer, C.: Swarm Intelligence. A whole new way to think about business. 
Harvard Bus. Rev. 79, 106‐114 (2001) 
13 Gloor, P.A.: Swarm creativity. Competitive advantage through collaborative innovation 
networks. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York (2006) 
14 Gloor, P., Cooper, S.: The new principles of a swarm business. MIT Sloan Manage. Rev. 
48, 81‐84 (2007) 
15 Kazadi, S., Lee, J.: Swarm Economics. In: Ao, S.-I., Rieger, B., Chen, S.-S. (eds.) Advanc-
es in Computational Algorithms and Data Analysis, 14, pp. 249–278. Springer (2009) 
16 Krause, J., Ruxton, G.D., Krause, S.: Swarm intelligence in animals and humans. Trends. 
Ecol. Evol. 25, 28–34 (2010) 
17 Dorigo, M., Gambardella, L.M.: Ant Colony System: A Cooperative Learning Approach to 
the Traveling Salesman Problem. Trans. Evol. Comp 1, 53–66 (1997) 
18 Dorigo, M., Stützle, T.: The Ant Colony Optimization Metaheuristic: Algorithms, Applica-
tions, and Advances. In: Glover, F., Kochenberger, G.A. (eds.) Handbook of Metaheuris-
tics, 57, pp. 250–285. New York (2003) 
19 Gambardella, L.M., Dorigo, M.: Ant-Q: A Reinforcement Learning approach to the travel-
ing salesman problem. In: Proceedings of Twelfth International Conference on Machine 
Learning, pp. 252–260. Morgan Kaufmann (1995) 
20 Lykourentzou, I., Vergados, D.J., Loumos, V.: Collective Intelligence System Engineering. 
In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Management of Emergent Digital Eco-
Systems, pp. 134‐140. ACM, New York, NY (2009) 
  
21 Heylighen, F.: Collective Intelligence and its Implementation on the Web: Algorithms to 
Develop a Collective Mental Map. Comput. Math. Organ. Theory 5, 253‐280 (1999) 
22 Kornrumpf, A., Baumöl, U.: From Collective Intelligence to Collective Intelligence 
Sytems: Definitions and a Semi-Structured Model. Int. J. Coop. Info. Syst. 22 (2013) 
23 Deneubourg, J.-L., Aron, S., Goss, S., Pasteels, J.M.: The Self-Organizing Exploratory 
Pattern of the Argentine Ant. Journal of Insect Behaviour 3, 159–168 (1990) 
24 Beckers, R., Deneubourg, J.-L., Goss, S.: Trails and U-turns in the Selection of a Path by 
the Ant Lasius niger. J. Theor. Biol., 397–415 (1992) 
25 Introne, J., Laubacher, R., Olson, G., Malone, T.: Solving Wicked Social Problems with 
Socio-computational Systems. Künstl Intell 27, 45-52 (2013) 
26 Kornrumpf, A., Baumöl, U.: Towards a Model for Collective Intelligence, Emergence and 
Individual Motivation in the Web 2.0. In: Mattfeld, D.C., Robra-Bissantz S. (eds.) Multik-
onferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik 2012, pp. 1809–1820. Berlin (2012) 
27 Rittel, H.W.J., Webber, M.M.: Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sci 4, 155-
169 (1973) 
28 Kornrumpf, A., Baumöl, U.: On the State of the Art in Simulation of Collective Intelligence 
– A Literature Review. In: Kundisch, D., Suhl, L., Beckmann, L. (eds.) Multikonferenz 
Wirtschaftsinformatik 2014, pp. 1746–1760. Paderborn (2014) 
29 Sutton, R.S., Barto, A.G.: Reinforcement learning: An introduction. The MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA (1998) 
30 Watkins, C.J., Dayan, P.: Q-learning. Machine Learning 8, 279–292 (1992) 
31 Devlin, S., Kudenko, D.: Theoretical Considerations of Potential-Based Reward Shaping 
for Multi-Agent Systems. In: Proceedings of The Tenth AAMAS, pp. 225–232 (2011) 
32 Leimeister, J.M., Huber, M., Bretschneider, U., Krcmar, H.: Leveraging Crowdsourcing: 
Activation-Supporting Components for IT-Based Ideas Competition. J. Manage. Inf. Syst 
26, 197‐224 (2009) 
33 Malone, T.W., Laubacher, R., Dellarocas, C.N.: The Collective Intelligence Genome. MIT 
Sloan Manage. Rev. 51, 21‐30 (2010) 
34 Quinn, A.J., Bederson, B.B.: Human computation: a survey and taxonomy of a growing 
field. In: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 
pp. 1403–1412. ACM, Vancouver, BC, Canada (2011) 
35 Chamberlain, J., Kruschwitz, U., Poesio, M.: Motivations for Participation in Socially 
Networked Collective Intelligence Systems. In: Malone, T.W., Ahn, L. von (eds.) Proceed-
ings CI 2012, vol. abs/1204.4071vol. (2012) 
36 Scekic, O., Truong, H.-L., Dustdar, S.: Incentives and rewarding in social computing. 
Commun. ACM 56, 72–82 (2013) 
37 Villarroel, J.A., Taylor, J.E., Tucci, C.L.: Innovation and learning performance implications 
of free revealing and knowledge brokering in competing communities: insights from the 
Netflix Prize challenge. Comput. Math. Organ. Theory 19, 42–77 (2013) 
38 Ahn, L. von, Maurer, B., McMillen, C., Abraham, D., Blum, M.: reCAPTCHA: Human-
Based Character Recognition via Web Security Measures. Science 321, 1465–1468 (2008) 
39 Ahn, L. von, Dabbish, L.: Labeling images with a computer game. In: Proceedings of the 
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 319–326. ACM, Vien-
na, Austria (2004) 
40 Müller, J.-P.: Emergence of Collective Behaviour and Problem Solving. In: Omicini, A., 
Petta, P., Pitt, J. (eds.) Engineering Societies in the Agents World IV, 3071, pp. 1–20. 
Springer, Berlin Heidelberg (2004) 
